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It is hard to think of a study that is more deﬁ nitive, 
ostensibly valid, practical, or relevant to public health 
than that reported by Tim Weaver and colleagues in 
The Lancet.1 Their study addressed the global problem 
of how to reduce the spread of hepatitis B virus (HBV) 
by drug users,2 and in particular the practical problem 
of increasing full compliance with the recommended 
regimen of three HBV vaccinations spread over a 
3 month period.3 In a cluster randomised trial done 
in the UK, the investigators showed that modest, 
contingent ﬁ nancial rewards signiﬁ cantly increased the 
likelihood of completion of all HBV vaccinations in this 
diﬃ  cult to access and high-risk group. Provision of £30, 
delivered either in equal or graduated instalments 
in return for as-scheduled attendance for the three 
injections, raised the rate of full adherence from 9% 
(six of 67 participants) in the treatment-as-usual group 
to more than 45% in the contingency management 
groups (35 of 78 [45%] and 32 of 65 [49%] participants 
receiving ﬁ xed or escalating value rewards, respectively; 
odds ratios 12·1 [3·7–39·9] and 14·0 [4·2–46·2]). 
Larger ﬁ nancial incentives therefore might produce 
even greater adherence of patients and public health 
protection for the UK’s population. But is it ethical 
to use this reward mechanism, is it practical, and is it 
smart policy?
I see no ethical problems with the study procedures. 
For participants, the likelihood and severity of risks 
from vaccination were far less serious than were the 
scope and likelihood of vaccine beneﬁ ts.4 No patient 
was denied care, none was pushed into receiving it, and 
full information was provided to allow patient decision 
making. In view of the deﬁ nitive nature of these 
ﬁ ndings, the question as to whether oﬀ ering the level 
of incentives necessary to protect increasing numbers of 
UK citizens is ethical could be asked—especially in areas 
of special public health concern and expense such as 
childhood vaccinations and infectious diseases.
Practical problems will arise if and when contingent 
incentive payments are scaled up, and the fact 
that contingent rewards were provided in Weaver 
and colleagues’ study1 by the regular health care 
staﬀ  without any additional specialist assistance is 
important. This feature suggests that such a procedure 
can be implemented in usual settings, but some 
questions remain. Where will health care teams get 
the funds to pay patients? Will special funding systems 
be set up for incentives and how will these funds 
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be monitored? If redeemable vouchers, cheques, 
or elimination of insurance copayments were to be 
oﬀ ered instead of cash, problems might arise because 
these mechanisms are not always as eﬀ ective as cash 
in producing the desired behaviour (and are often as 
diﬃ  cult to manage). If contingent incentives are to 
become more broadly used, new administrative and 
ﬁ scal procedures will be needed to allow them to be 
used in a clinically practical manner.
Is contingency management a smart approach? And 
are the extra costs of incentives worth it? To examine 
these questions, let us assume relatively ﬁ xed costs of 
vaccine provision (eg, medicine, salaries, and facilities), 
a reasonably high likelihood that unvaccinated, at-
risk patients would contract the illness and assume 
its associated costs, and that a substantial reduction 
would occur in those public health threats and costs 
from full vaccination. In cases where the ﬁ xed costs are 
high, the likelihood of illness is high, and the associated 
costs are high, incentives will probably be worthwhile. 
In this situation, contingent incentives mean that no 
payments are made without the desired behaviour: 
facilities only pay if the incentives work.
In cases in which a serious public health threat exists as 
well as an eﬀ ective but perhaps unattractive prevention 
or risk-reduction intervention, contingent incentives 
for at-risk patients can be ethical, cost eﬀ ective, and, in 
the right circumstances, practical. Nonetheless, many 
people will be left with the uneasy feeling that these 
kinds of incentives do not seem right. Why should 
an at-risk patient who stands to beneﬁ t directly from 
doing the right thing also have to be paid to do it? These 
feelings can be especially troubling if one assumes that 
preventive health care interventions are responsible 
actions with intrinsic moral value to self and others. 
As my mother always said about doing the right thing, 
virtue is its own reward.
But health-care interventions can also be thought 
of as commodities governed by rules of the 
marketplace—even in the UK.5 In this context, the 
treatment-as-usual group in Weaver and colleagues’ 
study might be seen as a market test of a product 
(preventive vaccination) in which the expected 
individual and public health value apparently was 
not worth the cost (ie, it meant injection pain, no 
immediate symptom relief, and several clinic trips) 
to the target customers (at-risk individuals). These 
value determinations are diﬃ  cult for many people 
who might underestimate the risk of modest dangers 
with relatively high and immediate likelihood (eg, 
inﬂ uenza); and overestimate risk of more serious 
dangers (eg, HIV or tuberculosis) with delayed and 
relatively low likelihood.6,7 In turn, the experimental 
incentive groups in Weaver and colleagues’ study 
can be thought of as seller-initiated eﬀ orts to oﬀ set 
decision balance and customer reluctance to purchase 
a service. In this context, the contingent ﬁ nancial 
incentives do not seem very diﬀ erent from similar 
seller-initiated immediate, positive rewards to attract 
targeted customers (eg, 20% oﬀ  coupons or buy-one-
get-one-free sales).
It might be lamentable to think of health care in 
this crass, commercial manner, but it could also 
be relevant to the ultimate goal of getting broad 
acceptance and use of cost-eﬀ ective prevention 
initiatives. Health care policy makers might be wise to 
consider traditional market forces when designing and 
delivering prevention strategies. The ﬁ ndings from 
Weaver and colleagues’ study1 suggest that contingent 
ﬁ nancial incentives might be as or more important 
in the disease prevention marketplace as they are in 
commercial markets.
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